This paper develops a theoretical explanation why it may be optimal for higher-level governments to pay categorical block grants or closed-ended matching grants to local governments. We consider a federation with two types of local governments which differ in the cost of providing public goods. The federal government redistributes between jurisdictions, but cannot observe the type of a jurisdiction. In this asymmetric information setting, it is shown that the second-best optimum can be implemented with the help of categorical block grants and closed-ended matching grants, but not with unconditional block grants or open-ended matching grants.
Introduction
In the literature on fiscal federalism, the optimal design of intergovernmental grants has extensively been analyzed. For a survey see e.g. Oates (1972 Oates ( , 1999 , Wildasin (1986) and Bird and Smart (2002) . Some key results of this literature are the following: If a higher-level government pays grants to lower-level governments, efficiency considerations imply that the grants should be designed as unconditional block grants. The lumpsum property of this type of transfers ensures that the spending decisions of lower-level governments are not distorted. However, distortionary grant policies may be optimal, if local decisions induce inefficiencies. Important examples are spill-over externalities arising if a region provides public goods which also benefit residents of other regions. Such externalities can be internalized by the use of open-ended matching grants which subsidize the cost of the public good producing the external benefits. One puzzling fact is that the theoretical predictions of the fiscal federalism literature are hardly consistent with many observed grant policies. As pointed out by Oates (1999) , the standard theory leaves little room to explain the existence of categorical block grants, i.e. lump-sum grants which have to be spent on certain purposes, and closed-ended matching grants, i.e. matching grants with a ceiling on the total amount of grants. These types of grants are distortionary and not suited to internalize externalities (Bezdeck and Jonathan, 1988) . But in many federations, they form a key part of the grants system. The most striking example is the U.S. system of federal grants to state and local governments HUBER AND RUNKEL In this paper, we develop a theoretical explanation why it may be optimal for higherlevel governments to pay categorical block grants and closed-ended matching grants. We consider a federation with two types of regions (jurisdictions). Both types of regions provide two local public goods, but differ in the cost of producing one of these goods. The objective of the federal government (the center) is to optimally redistribute between the regions. However, it cannot directly observe whether a jurisdiction is of the highcost or low-cost type. In this asymmetric information setting, we first characterize the second-best optimum. We then show that the second-best optimum can be implemented as the outcome of decentralized spending decisions, if the federal government (i) imposes a lump-sum tax on the regions which have to finance the redistribution (contributors) and (ii) offers a combination of an unconditional block grant and a categorical block grant or a closed-ended matching grant to the regions which benefit from redistribution (recipients). Pure unconditional block grants or open-ended matching grants are not suitable to implement the second-best allocation. The key rationale is that the secondbest optimum is characterized by a distortion of the recipients' spending decisions and a binding self-selection constraint for contributors. At least one of these two conditions is violated, if the center employs pure unconditional block grants or open-ended matching grants. But categorical block grants or closed-ended matching grants allow the center to satisfy both conditions simultaneously.
There is a growing literature on fiscal federalism under asymmetric information, for example, Cremer, Marchand and Pestieu (1996) , Raff and Wilson (1997) , Bucovetsky, Marchand and Pestieu (1998), Lockwood (1999) , Cornes and Silva (2002) and Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001) . However, since all these studies include in their analysis at most one public good, they cannot explain the use of categorical block grants, and they also do not make the point for closed-ended matching grants. Cornes and Silva (2003) consider the spending mix on two public goods under asymmetric information.
